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I~ THE SUPREME COCRT OF THE STATE OF ~TAH 
JOHN P. CONDAS, GEORGE P. 
CONDAS, HA?.RY P. co;mAS 
~RGARITA CREGLOW ELLIS 
and TESSIE MADSEN, 
Plainti:"fs and Respondents, 
~,;rs . 
Case :Jo. 15669 
:-;EO?GE J. CO~lDAS, 'lJ..?.Y 
.::ONDAS LEfL'!ER, CHRIS J . 
.::o:lDAS, :iiC!< J. CO~E:lAS, 
ELLEN CONDAS 3AYAS, 
,:O,:::.,EXANDP.A CO::'iDAS OCi<EY and 
J. COcWAS CORPO?.ATION, a 
~tah corporat1on, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ST.:'..TE..'1ENT OF THE KIN: ~F C.~.SE 
Actlon to establish a public roadway and/or a prescriptive 
easement :"or a r'Jad·...,a:; across ::le:"endants-appellants lands in 
;~hlte Pine Canyon ln Su:nrnit County, c:'tah, and for injunctive 
relief to orcer removal o: gates across t:.e roadway and to enjoin 
defendants-appellants :"rom obstructing cr ~ncerfering with 
·1ehlcle or foot ~ra·1el 3long the =oadwa~· ~c or from plaintiffs-
~esponden~s lanes. 
~ISP0SIT!C~ IN THE ~OWER COCRT 
The tr~al coJrt heli t~at plalntlffs-respondents failed 
:o establlsn a ~rescr~~:~ve ease~ent across defendants-appellants 
Accordingly, it 
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(1) adjudging that the existing roadway up ',lhite Pine 
Canyon is a public road as it passes through and beyond the 
lands of defendants-appellants; 
(2) ordering defendants-appellants to remove the gates 
which they erected across said roadway; and 
(3) enjoining defendants-appellants from interfering with 
or in any manner obstructing the use of the roadway by plaintiC::s-
respondents and by the public generally through the lands of 
defendants-appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-appellants seek to reverse the whole of the 
Decree and to remand the case to the lower court with i:-tstruc-
tions to enter an Amended Decree dismissing plaintiffs' Complair.: 
and adjudging that the roadway across defendants-appellants 
lands in \~hite Pine Canyon is their private roadway and ?lai:r::if:;-
respondents own no interest or right therein, or that failing, a 
new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
To simplify matters, defendants-appellants collectively 
will be referred to hereinafter as defendants and tJlaintiffs-
respondents collectively will be referred to hereinafter as 
plaintiffs and individual defendants or ?laintiffs will be 
designated by name. 
Defendants are the owners of approximately 2,600 acres 
of land and plaintiffs are the owners of ap~roximately S40 acres 
of land, both in the area of White Pine Canyon. (Fdqs. l, 2, 
R.2ll, Exhs. 1-P, 14-D). The north line of defendants' lands 
- 2 -
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begins near ~he ~ou~h of ~hite Pine Canyon and extends up White 
Pine Canyon and over into the area of Iron Mountain (Exhs. 1-P, 
14-D). Plaintiffs' lands are situate u?-canyon and for the most 
part are bounded on the North and South by defendants' lands 
(Exhs. 1-P, 14-D). 
Defendants are the children and successors of John G. 
Condas who acquired the lands in part patented by Delbert Redden, 
in part under his own homestead patents and in part patented by 
~is brother, Gust Condas (Exhs. 33-D, 34-D, 35-D, 11-D). Plain-
tiffs are the children and successors of Peter G. Candas who 
acquired his lands under his own homestead patent (Exh. 12-D• 
John G. Condas and Peter G. Condas were brothers, making defendants 
and ?laintiffs first cousins. 
The first homestead entry was made by Delbert Redden in 
1912 covering the northernmos~ lands of defendants in the mouth 
o: Wh~te Pine Can~·on on which the buildings and improvements were 
located (Ex. 33-D). Del~er~ H. Redden filed an additional home-
s~ead entry in 1922 covering the adjoin~ng land up White Pine 
Canyon and ta the East (Exh. 34-D). John G. Condas filed homestead 
entr~es in 1912 and 1916 coverlng lands adjoining the Redden 
proper~:_; (Exh. 35-D). Gust Condas filed an adjoining homestead 
entry in 1924 covering lands up-canyon and to the South and 
Sast i Exh. 11-D). Patents to the above lands were thereafter 
lssued. John G. Candas acquired the Redden property in 1925, 
md thereafter recel':ed '1~s own t=oatents and acquired the lands 
of Gust Condas, maklng t~e lands now owned by defendants. In 
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1926, Peter G. Candas filed his homestea~ entry and in !929 
acquired a patent to the lands now owned by plaintiffs (Exh. 
12-D). 
Defendants' predecessor John G. Candas was the defendant 
in an action entitled Patrick Sullivan, et ux, plaintiffs v. 
John G. Candas, defendant, being Salt Lake County Civil ~o. 
42140, concerning the White Pine Canyon Road as it crossed the 
Sullivan property immediately to the ~orth of the lands then 
owned by John G. Candas. Plaintiffs' predecessor, Peter G. 
Candas, was not a party to the foregoing action. A final Decree 
was entered therein on December 4, 1928 (Exh. 36-D) whlch 
adjudicated that a public highway existed from the Park City 
Highway along Trottman's Lane and over and across Sullivan's 
property to the gate (on the North line of the then John G. 
Condas property) . An appeal was taken by plaintiffs Sulllvan 
to the Utah Supreme Court and its opinion is reported ln 76 ~ta~ 
585, 290 Pac. 954 (1930) wherein the decree of the trial court 
was affirmed. 
One of the pivotal issues in this case was '"'hether any 
portion of the Abstract of the Record (Exh. 2-P) or the 3rie:s 
(Exhs. 3-P, 4-P) filed in Sullivan v. Candas, supra (Supreme 
Court Case No. 4922) was admissible in evidence in this case. 
Plaintiffs offered in evidence the foregoing Abstract a~ ?eccr~ 
(R. 405) to which defendants objected (R.~OS-409) and ~he Court 
initially would not receive it (R.408-410). Therea:tec-, ::cla~:lt~:'; 
attempted to o~fer portions o~ the ~ore~oi~s Abst~3·:~ c~ ?ecor~ 
- 4 -
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=lece~ea: b· rea~~~g excE~pts t~ereof i~to the record comprising 
paragrap~ l~ o: the Answer and Counterclaim of defendant therein, 
John Candas (2.411,412) to which defendants objected (R.412,413) 
and moved to strike (R.416) which ~otion was taken under advise-
ment by the trial court (R.416). 
Thereafter, plaintiffs were permitted to read into the 
record from Exhib~t 3-P (~espondents' Brief) over defendants' 
obJection and subject to their :1otion to Stri:.r;:e (R.422), portions 
o: the abstracted testimony of se•1eral witnesses and/or summar~es 
t~ereo:, incl-lcing the summarized testimc!"'.f c:= John G. ConC.as, 
as sur:unarized bj his law:/er 'R. 423-~35. ~ncl. I. De:"en.::a~.::s then 
mo•;eC. to str~i<e all o: the :"oregoing testimony and summan.es 
iR-~35, which the trial court took under adv~sement (R.436). 
At the concl·-lsion ::J:= plai:1ti:=:=s' ~--i se:--.ce, plaintiffs 
reo:=:=ered int::J evidence desiqnated parts o: t~e Abstract of the 
Record in the Sull~van case, ~ncluded ~n Exhibit 2-P; to-wit, 
the Answer and Countercla1m of John G. Condas, the ~ecree, all 
of the testlmony o:"fered bj ~r. John Condas, including the 
findings c: the ~istr~ct C::Jurt of which a part of Finding No. 8 
was read i:1to the record iR.6l9-622, incl.1. 
their Ob~ect1on anc :1otion to Strike ( R. 624). 
Defendants renewed 
The trial court 
overruled de:"endants' Objection and received the evidence subject 
to de:'e:1dants' ~otl:::n to Str1'::e rR.62~\. 
Defe:1dants were to be af:"orded the opportun1ty to proffer 
other portlons of the Abstract of Record 1n the Sullivan v. Candas 
case a:=ter tne ~~wer court =~led on defenda:1ts' ~otion to Strike 
- ~ -
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(R.622,623,624). At the conclusion o: de:er-.C:a::ts' e':::.ce:1ce, ·~ 
was again made clear that in the event the trial court ruled t~~ 
above proffer admissible, defendants would be afforded the 
opportunity to present any additional documentation out of the 
Sullivan v. Condas case which they determine necessary (R.965). 
Some three and one-half months after final arguments, t~e 
lower court ruled that the abstracts of testimony in the Sulli?~ 
v. Condas case and the pleadings of John Condas, and the :inC:l~:: 
and Decree were admissible in this case and on that basis declde: 
this case on its merits (R.l90,19l) without affording de:endan~3 
an opportunity to proffer rebuttal portions of the above al:stnc: 
as defendants had been repeatedly assured they would be ?er~1t:e: 
to do ( Tr. 6 2 2 , 6 2 3 , 6 2 4 , 9 6 5 ) . 
Defendants are mindful of the time-honored rules of 
appellant review which require stating the :acts in the lic~t 
most favorable to the Findings of Fact and Decree below. Howe·:e~ 
in view of the difficulties above enumerated and defendants' :~r 
position as to the inadmissibility of such e·ndence, de fen dan ts' 
further Statement of Facts herein is developed to the exclusion 
of such evidence. 
In 1903, only a trail about four or five feet wide ex1s:e~ 
up White Pine Canyon to the flats (Supplemental Record - Ja~es 
Archibald Deposition, p. 8) wh1ch remained the same in 1905 or 
1906 (ibid p. 10) and 1907 (ibid p. ll). The Trott~an Lane usei 
to connect with the road to Red Pine Canyon as it came au: of 
McDonald's Basin (ibid p. 15). From 1903 to l9l' 3 •:er::· ::oar 
trail existed up the bottom of White ?1ne Ca::yon, out no road 
- 6 -
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:or a wagon 1Suoplemental Record - Earl Johnson Deposition, pp. 7, 
8, 9, 10). The Trottman Lane was passable by a wagon to the Del 
Redden cabln but not beyond (ibid p. 11). 
From 1915 to 1920 only a horse trail existed which was 
steep and rough with a lot of rocks (R.438,442,443,445). In 1908 
or 1910 and in 1915 there wasn't any trail to amount to anything 
IR.47l,475). I:-~ 1922 there was no road up White Pine Canyon 
IR. 64 4) • 
From 1920 to 1950 only a single trail existed up White 
Pine Canyon beyond the first stream crossing above the John Condas 
buildings (R.652,655,659,666,667,672,675,676,680,681,689,69l, 
729,734,735,736,737,749,750,760,762,763,771,775,~84,79G,-9l,855, 
856,885,904,905,912,915,916,925,931,943). The only exceptions 
were described as a trail where you could drive a car through 
(?.533), or someti:ne bet·.veen 1925 and 1929, :;r.:.nts of t•,.;o tracks 
showing that four-wheeled vehicles had been on the road (R.498) 
or in 1342 a road or trail not: :nanrnade ·,.;ith tracks (R.969), or 
an u:-~improved road or jeep trall ln 1940 based on opinion R.lJ36) 
From 1903 ·_mtil 1925 no one but <:he Condases and an 
occasional horseback rider was seen traveling in White Pine Canyon 
(Supplemental Record - James Archibald Deposition, pp. 12,22; 
Supf)lementa'.. Recor:)- Earl Johnson Depositlon, pp. 9,10; (R.44l, 
475,6"75). 
Durlng the '/ears 19~5 :o 1928, John G. Condas, predecessor 
ln interest of jefendants, construc~ed a series of fences and 
gates Wlthin the northerly pcr':ion o~ his property dividing the 
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same into several pastures and corral areas which included a 
wooden gate across the roadway entering his property on the 
North line thereof and a series of division fences and wire 
gates along the roadway through his pasture and corral areas 
and a wooden gate of only sufficient width to permit passage 
of a person riding horseback across the roadway near the southerl· 
end of his pasture area (Fdg.9, R.213; Exh.l5-D). 
The wooden gate and its replacements constructed across 
the roadway on the North line of the John G. Condas property 
was uaually maintained in a closed and locked condition, when-
ever John G. Condas and his successors were away from the 
property, generally since the construction thereof until the 
present time, and was generally maintained in a closed but 
unlocked condition when they were present on the property and 
said gates were generally posted with "keep out" or "no 
trespassing" signs since the construction thereof until the 
present time (Fdg.lO, R.213). 
During the period from 1926 to 1932, inclusive, entry 
upon and use of the roadway up White Pine Canyon across defend-
ants' property by plaintiffs' predecessor in interest was w~~h 
the permission and consent of defendants' predecessor in lnteres: 
who provided a key to the locked gate to plaintiffs' predecessor 
in interest (Fdg.ll, R.213). 
During the period from 1933 to 1970, inclusive, plainti::s 
and/or their predecessors in interest, leased their lands to 
defendants' predecessor in interest and/or defendants or t~e 
- 8 -
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lands of both part1es were jointly leased to third persons and 
all during said period the entry upon and use of the roadway up 
White Pine Canyon across defendants' property by plaintiffs and 
their predecessors in interest was with the consent and permission 
of defendants and/or their predecessor in interest (Fdg.l2, R.213, 
214) . 
During the period from 1926 to 1970, inclusive, the use 
of the roadway by plaintiff and their predecessors in interest 
was under a claim of right and not in recognition of defendants' 
claimed right to grant or deny permission to u.se same (Fdg .13, 
R. 214 l . 
In 1972, defendants petitioned the Board of County Com-
missioners of Summit County to vacate a portion of the roadway 
across the northerly portion of their ia~~s _f such public road 
existed 1Fdg.l7, R.214), and that portion of :he roadway was 
'Tacated by Ordi:-~ance 63 dated September 6, 1972 (Exh. 39-D) as 
3.mended on Februar:_; 7, 1973 (Exh. 38-D). The Board of Commis-
sioners did not gi~e notice of the vacation to the plaintiffs 
nor did they (it) publish notice of the vacation prior to 
enacting the vacating ordinance (Fdg.lB, R.2141. Notice of 
the enactment of Ordinance 63 was published in the Park Record 
on September 14, 1972 I:Sxh. 40-D). 
""-RGUMECJT 
I:-~troduction 
We are rnlnd~ul :~at under tradltional rules of appellant 
re·:tew t~e F1~d1~~5 ~~ ~~e ~ri~l cour~ are indulged with a 
- 9 -
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presumption of correctness and the burden is ~pon the attackee 
to demonstrate that they are in error and should be overturned. 
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972); First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., v. Wright, (Utah) 521 P.2d 563 
(1974). Here the Findings of the trial court are not only 
unsupported by competent evidence, but are against the over-
whelming weight of the evidence. To establish a public thoroug~­
fare, plaintiffs have the burden of proving public user for 10 
years by clear and convincing evidence. Petersen v. Combe, 
20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545 (1968); Thomson v. Condas, 27 
Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972). And for a matter to be clear 
and convincing it must at least have reached the point '-"here 
there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the correct-
ness of the conclusion. Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 
P.2d 194 (1949); Jardine v. l-.rchibald, 3 Utah 2d 88, 279 P.2d 
454 (1955). 
We are also mindful that different rules of appellant 
review apply depending upon whether the case is one of law 
rather than equity. The instant action seeks injuncti'le relie:' 
against interference with an alleged easement and the trial 
court invoked collateral estoppel, an equitable remedy, in 
granting the injunctive relief. And where do~bt exists as to 
whether a cause should be one in equity or one in law, ~he tria: 
court should have some latitude of discretion. Sweene: '1. Hap?~ 
Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126 (l:J661. 
an equity case, and having been so treateC. b,· t'le ~r:a: SC''Jct. 
- 10 -
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concludes tha~ t~e evidence clearly preponderates against the 
Decislon. Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, Sec. 9; Rule 72(a), 
U.R.C.P.; Stanley''· Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P.2d 465 (1939); 
Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., (Utah) 530 P.2d 815 (1974); Provo 
City v. Lambert, (Utah) 574 P.2d 727 (1978). 
~he key issue on t~ls appeal is whether the Abstract 
of Record in Sullivan v. Candas (Supreme Court Case No. 4492), 
and Appellants' Brief and Respondents' Brief filed therein are 
admlSSlble as evidence ln this case. Inherent in that issue 
are 
( l) w~ether ~:'1e pleadings and abstracted testimon:: of 
defendants' predecessor, John G. Candas, are declarations 
a~ainst interes~ ~h~ch ca~ be invoked a~ai~s~ ~~fendants in 
th_;_s case, and 
\2) whet~er the Findings in this case can rest on 
abstracted test_;_mony o: Wltnesses w~o testified in the Sullivan 
case, anc 
1J: whether ~he ~octrine of Collateral Estoppel applies 
or can be l~,,oke1 aga~~st je~endants i~ thls case . 
. :>,bsent the X::::stract of Record in S~..:lll?an .,. Condas, 
there 1s no s~..:bstantial evldence to support the findings of the 
tr1al court that a publ1c road had been estab~ished in White 
Pi:1e Can:;or.. 
ln tn1s case ~stabllshes that from at least 1903 until 1950 only 
- _j_ -
-
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crossing just above defendants' buildings. Llkewise ~~e e~1jen:~ 
overwhelmingly establishes that during the whole of such ?ericd 
the only means of travel up White Pine Canyon was by foot or 
by horseback and it was not until 1950 and 1951 when a bull-
dozer cut a makeshift roadway up White Pine Canyon which made 
it passable for even 4-wheel drive vehicles. 
The sum and substance of it all is that the trial court 
disregarded the evidence in this case and found against defend-
ants because it regarded the position taken by defendants ln ~~is 
case as being opposite to the position taken by their predecesso: 
in Sullivan v. Candas. In so doing the trial court erroneously 
admitted into evidence the Abstract of the Record in Sulli•1an 
v. Candas and the briefs filed therein, misconstrued the Findincs 
of Fact therein and misapplied the Doctrine of Collateral 
Estoppel herein. The trial court then decided the case agalnst 
the defendants without affording them the reassured oppor~~n~~! 
to proffer rebuttal portions of the abstract. The end result 
of it all is that the trial court opened defendants' lands to 
the public by subjecting the same to a public ::::oadway whlch ne·;e: 
existed across their lands in fact or in law and in so doing 
committed reversible error. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTI:JG THE .:,.BSTP_;cT JF 
RECORD I:l SULLIVAN V. COC'WAS I SUPRE~E C'JGRT c.;s;:: ·;r;. 
4922) AND THE BRIEFS FILED THEREI~ ,:._s E'!IDE:lCE :!:'1 
THIS CASE. 
- 12 -
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:e~e~~an~s· 9~edecessor ~ohn G. Candas was defendant 
in Sulll"Ja:1 '/, Condas (Sal<: Laf::e County Civil )lo. 42140) and 
neither plai:1ti:fs nor their predecessor in interest was a 
t:Jarty therei:1. Sullivans owned the land immediately North and 
adjoining the land of Joh:1 G. Condas. A roadway known as Trott-
~an Lane extended froD the main highway across the lands of 
Sulli"Jans and onto <:he land of John G. Candas. There Sullivans 
s~ed Candas fo~ trespass and by wa~ c~ Ans~er a~d Co·~n~erclalm 
~he tr1al ccurt he:d that 
~ ?Ublic roadway existed across Sulli"Jans' land up to the gate 
':'he tr1.al court 
across <:e:e:1da:1": .:o;;..=:as' la:1.is. 
?esponde~:. Joh~ 3. Condas ~n s,~ll~~an v. Candas Cons~itutes 
'/:car1ous -~C-rn~.:;s1o::.s ~.ga; :13':: Je:e:--l.::an':s 1n t:'1l3 .~ction. 
~.::.ca:-lous a:i;;~lss:.ons 3.:-e cc:~t:-:-l:ec 6\· ?·Jle 63 1,91, 
'-'. :"\ . .:.. and 3.re :1m~ted to agency, 
employ~ent, conspirator or =hird-person contractual l1.ability 
relatior.s:--.::.;:;s, e10:1e CJf ·,.;:C1ch a:-e ;:;rese!1t 1n this case. The 
:')rego~:~c; r·-..::e ·~w·as o:.a~2;1 :r::~ ~ule 631 9), 'Jni:or:n ~ules of 
Conference of Commissioners 
.::vne:-1::-aC~ La,..- IC~stitute), Rule 508. 
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Declarations of predecessors in interest, whlle us~all; 
treated as vicarious admissions, are excluded from ~odel Code 
Rule 508 (Rule 63(9), U.R.E.) but may be included in the ~odel 
Code Rule 509 (Rule 63(10), U.R.E.). American Law Institute, 
Model Code of Evidence, Rule 509, p. 251. The Model Code omits 
any provision for admitting declarations of predecessors in 
interest except under the Code's liberal rules admitting declar-
ations against interest. McCormick on Evidence, Section 245, 
p. 523. 
Wigmore acknowledges that the Morgan Theory of Vicarious 
Admissions (adopted by the Model Code and Uniform Rules of 
Evidence), has sought to overthrow the whole theory of vicario'JS 
admissions as set forth in Wigmore's Treatise. Wigmore on 
Evidence, Section 1080(a), p. 195. The rationale for the 
Morgan theory is that the reception of so-called admissions 
made by persons related to the now opponent only by a "pri~ity 
of interest", is a transfer into evidence law of numerous ~ests 
of substantive law which have nothing to do Wlth evidential 
values and that in result, the rules of e•1ide:1ce adrr,it copiousl::, 
as "vicarious admissions", many sorts of extra judic:ial s~atemen<::o 
of third persons which have all the testimonial weaknesses 
struck at by the hearsay rule, and which thus :'orm an anomal:JUS 
and undesirable sort of evidence. Wigmore on E•:ldence, supra. 
In ruling on defendants' Objection and ~otlon to Stri%e, 
the trial court held that the allegations or assertions of 
fact contained in the pleadings !Answer and Counterc:lalm of 
- 14 -
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Jonn G. CondasJ ~s the~ pert~~n to White Pine Canyon, are 
3.dmissible as ''admissions" against interest (as to this 
proceeding), made by an authorized agent of defendants' 
predecessor in title, John Candas (R.l90). The problem with 
that is the trial court overlooked the distinction between a 
declaration and an admission. A "declaration" is the asser-
tion or a statement of fact and an "admission" is a voluntary 
acknowledgement ~ade by a party of the existence or truth of 
cer-tai:~ :acts. 29 .\re1. Jur. 2d, E?idence, §597, p. 651. Thus, 
~n adm~sslon is ~ position taken by an adversarj, either per-
sonally or through an authorized agent, which is contrary to 
and inconsistent with the contention now being made by him ~~ 
the litlgation. Ibid. p. 652. 
The ple~dings of Jchn G. Candas made by his attorney in 
Sulli·;~:; ?. Cond~s ~lght ·..Jell 2e admissions ·.,·h~c", c:Juld be 
Jsed agal:;st hi~ ~n subsequent litigation under Rule 63(9), 
U.R.E., since he authorized the same. However, such would not 
be admissible as against these defendants in this case under 
?ule 63(91, C:.R.::::., s~:;ce declarations of predecessors in 
Lnterest ~re excluded ~rom that rule under the autnor~tleS cited 
above. 
The pr1or testLmon~ o~ John G. Candas would be admissible 
aga1nst hir<1 i:1 s·Jbsequent l~tigat~on .mder ?ule 63 ilO), U.R.E., 
if it c0nsti~utes a declar3tl8n against i:1.terest. Likewise, his 
pr~or dec:'lrat~ons, if against his interest at the time made, 
· ... •ou]....j be 3.·~"7\.!.SS:..:::·le 3c;ai:1s': Ce:endan~S in this ?roceeding under 
- l3 -
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the general rule cited by this Court in Lyman Grazlng Assoc. 
Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 473 P.2d 905 (1970). Ho·..,ever, to be 
admissible here under Rule 63(10), U.R.E., such declaratlons 
must be statements of fact made by John G. Candas hi~self 
against his interest at the time made. 
(2) Neither the Pleadings, Testimony or Brief of 
Respondent, John G. Candas, in Sullivan v. Candas are Admissible 
as Declarations Against Interest. 
The exception to the hearsay rule of declarations 
against interest are covered by Rule 63(10), U.R.E., which 
requires that such statement be made by the declarant and be 
against the interest of the declarant when made. Rule 63 (10), 
U.R.E., was taken from Rule 63(10), Uniform Rules of Evidence, 
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Unifor7 
State Laws in 1953, which notes that this exception, as does 
Model Code Rule 509, changes the prevailing rules by making 
declarations against interest admissible even though the 
declarant is available as a witness, and by recogn2zing the 
value of declarations against a social, as well as his pecuniac 
or proprietary interest. 
Under Model Code Rule 509, the facts staced must be 
contrarJ to the interest of the declarant at the time of the 
statement, and evidence of the declaration is admisslble '"her-
ever relevant, no matter against whom it is offered. .;mer lean 
Law Instit'-.lte, Model Code of E•1idence, Rule 309, p. 236. :-low-
ever, as noted above, such declarations must be 3n 3ssert10n o~ 
- 16 -
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a statement of ~act ~ade by the declarant himself. Thus, 
neither the ?lead1ngs or brief of res?ondent John G. Condas in 
Sullivan v. Condas are admissible as declarations against 
interest in this case under Rule 63(10), U.R.E. 
The only declarations which might qualify under Rule 
63(10), U.R.E., are the statements of John G. Condas in his 
testimony in Sullivan v. Condas. A careful reading of the 
abstracted 90rtion of his testimony rExh. 2-P, pp. 104-111, incl., 
194, 195) reveals no statement ::Jr declaration by him of a 
public roadway '.l? "tJhi te ?ine Canyon tl'lrough his prooerty. The 
most that can be said about it is his abstracted st.atement or. 
page 111 thereof that 
"~; corrals and sheds do not shut off what 
might o~her~ise be a trail or a road up t~e 
canyon. I have a trail outside of my ccrrals. 
~~en t~ey =orne ~p ~l~~ sheep ~~ey have ~c ;o 
arounc." 
~oth1ng conta1ned there1n constitutes a declaration against 
lnterest ~ithin t~e mean1ng and definition of Rule 63(10), 
:_~.~.E. Accordlngl;, even the abstracted testimony of John G. 
Condas in Sulll"lan v. Condas is i."ladmissible as evidence in this 
case. 
(3) The .::..bstrac': o: Record in Sullivan''· Condas Does 
~ot Come Within the Hearsay Exception of Content of Official 
?,eco!:"d 1._·:--.der Hul2 63 ':._ -:~, C.~.E. 
"O:'f1c1al ?ecord" 1s de:'1ned 1n R'.lle 68 (4), U.R.E., 
and means all out~:c ·o~c-lti:->CTS, incl•.ldl:1S laws, judicial records, 
1 - -
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Rule 63(17), U.R.E., is an exception to the ~earsa; rule onl; 
to prove the content of an official record. In Bridges v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 26 Utah 2d 281, 488 P.2d 738 (1971), 
this Court noted that the explanatory note under Rule 63(15), 
U.R.E., states: 
. It is not designed to permit the admission 
of a judgment or finding of fact of a court or adminis-
trative body for the purpose of proving the matters 
upon which such judgment or finding of fact were baseC.." 
The foregoing is equally applicable here and the Abstract o~ 
Record in Sullivan v. Candas is not admissible under Rule 63117!, 
U.R.E. 
(4) Abstracted Portions of Selected Testimony From the 
Abstract of Record in Sullivan v. Candas Do Not Come Withln 
the Hearsay Exception of Depositions and Prior Testimony Cnder 
Rule 63 (3), U.R.E. 
Testimony given at a former trial or proceedi:1g bet·.veer: 
the parties to an action or proceeding is hearsay, and ~nless 
a proper foundation is laid to bring S•.1ch testimony •.vi thin the 
exception to the hearsay rule, it is not admissible in e·1idence. 
29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §738, pp. 807, 808. The trial court 
held that the abstracts of testimony in the Sulli'lan v. Candas 
case is material and relevant and meets the requireme:1ts of 
Rule 63(3)(b)(i) and (ii), U.R.E., (R.l90). 
Rule 63(3), U.R.E., requires that prior testimon:.: 
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule is sub~ect to 
the same limitations and objections as tho~gh t~e dec:~ra:1~ 
- 13 -
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It requires a finding that the 
declarant is una~ailable as a witness and no evidence was 
offered by plaintiffs to establish such fact as to any declar-
ant except defendants' predecessor John G. Candas. 
In order to prove testimony given at a former trial, 
it must also appear that there is substantial identity of 
9arties and issues. 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, 5743, p. 812; 
Annotation: 70 A.L.R. 2d 494. John G. Candas was the 
defendant in the fo~er case of Sullivan v. Candas, but 
neither plaintiffs nor their predecessor in lnterest was a 
9arty thereto. 
the Sullivans. 
~or are plaintiffs successors in lnterest c0 
The iss'.le in t!1e former trial was whether a 
?Ubllc roadway existed across the Sullivan property and not 
~hether a public roadway exlsted across th~ ;;h~ ~. Candas 
Thus, there lS no S'.lbstantial identity of parties 
and lSSues to satisfy the req'.llsites for admissibility of 
such hearsay evidence. 
The form of t:"te foe1er testlmon:~ :nay be by oral testimony 
of other •,;itnesses ·,;he hear::l and remember the former testimony 
or by a ~erified copy of the transcript, stenographic notes 
or by notes made by a witness which correctly and accurately 
and full:/ reproduce the former testimony. 29 .=\In. Jur 2d, 
E'lidence, :)76:], -;"61, 76-l, -6:0; .~nnotacion: 11 .~.L.R. 2d 30. 
The whole S'-!bsta:1ce of :::-:e ·...-hole of the for:-:ter ·,;itness' testi-
mony, or at least the substance of the whole testimony on the 
~articular ~oint or :ss~e :nvo!ved in the previous trial, must 
oe ~~c·:e~~, 1~cl~~:~·~ jo~~ ~~s::~on· ~1ven on t~e direct examin-
- 19 -
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ation and testimony given on the cross-examination, a::. <:!-.ough '.::--.e: 
identical words need not be reproduced. Annotation: ll .i\.L.E. 
2d 30, §32, p. 112; 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence, §762, p. 832. 
Here the prior testimony is not in the form of an official 
transcript nor the testimony of a witness who was present at 
the Sullivan v. Condas trial. Rather, it is in the form of an 
abstract of selected portions and/or summarized statements of 
prior testimony. Accordingly, the abstracted testimony in the 
form offered is inadmissible in this case against these defend-
ants. Furthermore, a litigant is not at all bound by the 
testimony given by his witnesses on a former trial of the same 
case; that is to say, the former testimony does not, on the 
latter trial, constitute evidence of the true facts in regard 
to which the inquiries were made. Annotation: 74 A.L.R. 2d 
521, 522. For the trial court to base its findings in this case 
on selected extracts and/or summarized statements of testu"on~· 
given in Sullivan v. Condas is reversible error. 
(5) The Trial Court Erred in Taking Judicial ~ot~ce of 
the Findings of Fact and Decree in Sullivan v. Condas and ~n 
Admitting the Same in Evidence from the Abstract of Record 
Therein. 
The trial court concluded that the Find~ngs of Fact and 
Decree in the Sullivan case constitute a public record of 
judicial proceedings of which the court may take ~ud~c~al notlce 
or receive under other rules qualifying same for introdJCtlon 
into the evide:1ce in this case (R.l91J. 
- 20 -
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s~~li~an v. Co~das ~ere of~ered by plaintiffs as a part of the 
.c,bstract of Record (Exh. 2-P, p!=J. 36-43, incl.; R.405,619-622, 
incl. l . The Decree was offered by plaintiffs as a part of the 
same Abstract of Record (Exh. 2-P, pp. 45-49, incl.; R.405,619-
622, incl. l. Plaintiffs did not offer certified copies from 
the District Court files. A certified copy of the Decree was 
separately offered by defendants and was received (Exh. 36-D; 
? .. 962,963). 
The r~le applicable ~o Judicial proceedlngs is that, 
while a court may take JUdicial notice of the proceedings and 
records ln the case be~ore it, the court cannct ln one c~se 
take judicial notice of its own records in another and dlf~erent 
case. ?obison v. Kelly, 69 Utah 376, 255 Pac. 430 (1927); 
Spencer •;. Industrial Commission, 81 C~a:-, ell, 2J P.2d 618 
( 19 3 3 i . :-lore recen~ly ~his Cour'::. sta~ed the rule in State, 
in the Interest ·of Hales, r:.:tah) 538 P.2d 1034 11975), as 
follows: 
"In anv case ~he court should not take notice 
sua sDonte ;: the Droceedinqs in another case unless 
the files of the other case-are placed in evidence 
in the mat~er be~~re the court." 
To the same effect is Carter·:. Carter, ·.Utah) 563 P.2d 177 
!1977). ~or can this court Judicially notice proceedings and 
Johanson v. Cudahv 
Packi~g lH, 152 P.:d 98 ( 194 .j) • 
0n:y the ~ecree 1n Su!li~an v. Ccndas decided any of 
All that ~ecree dec1des relevant here is 
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that a public highway exists from the main State highwa: and 
running along Trottman's Lane, Southerly toward White Plne 
Canyon and over Sullivans' land to the gate on the South 
boundary of the Sullivan property. The Decree is clear and 
unambiguous. 
An ambiguous Judgment (or Decree) is subject to the same 
construction according to the rules that apply to all written 
instruments. Moon Lake %'ater Users Association v. Hanson, (uta~. 
535 P.2d 1262 (1975). Where (as here) a judgment lS clear anc 
unambiguous, neither pleadings, findings of fact nor a verdict 
may be resorted to change its meaning. Chronister v. State Fau. 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., (N.M.) 381 P.2d 673 (1963); Callan v. Callac., 
(Wash.) 468 P.2d 456 (1970). If a judgment is not amblguous 
and leaves nothing for interpretation, there is no need to re:e: 
to the pleadings or other parts of the Record. 
Judgments, §76, p. 365. 
46 .:>.m. Jur. 2c, 
The trial court committed error ln taking Judicial not::e 
of the Findings of Fact in Sullivan v. Condas and in admittln= 
the same in evidence in the form of the Abstract of Record. ':'~.e 
trial court committed reversible error in making and entering 
its Findings of Fact 6 and 7 based thereon and in foundina ltS 
Decree on such findings. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO THE F.'\CTS OF 
THIS CASE. 
- 22 -
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ihe ~hole basis for the ~rial court's decision in 
thlS case is su~ed up in its Oecision dated August 2, 1977, 
(R.l9l) as follows: 
"Based upon the principle of collateral estoppel, 
this Court concludes that the plaintiffs' (Defendants') 
predecessor having succeeded in prior litigation on 
his clai~ that a public road existed uc White Pine 
Canyon, his successors in interest can~ot now turn 
from that benefit established in a court of law to 
take an opposite position to gain another benefit 
at t:Hs ~ime. !Richards?. Hodson, 26 U. 2d 113, 
:-:ec:-.an ·:.City of Cle:1dale, -i89 P.2d 65.)" 
:et 1:1 ?:.c:-,ards .,. C!odson, 26 '.:tah 2d, 485 P.2d 1044 119"71), 
a:1d cited bj ~he tr1al court, this Court held that col:ateral 
a party in a prior action. ~hus on pages 115 and 116 cf the 
~tah Repcr~s. this Court clearly stated the applicat1on of the 
:cctrine of Collateral Estoppel 1n ~ta- as :c:lows: 
";.. :or:n o: res j'J.Ci.:ata a7!=:.ies ~o situations 
like th:.s wherein :.ssues ~hich are actually decided 
aca:.r.st a party in a prior action may be relied 
upcn cy an opponent in a later case as having been 
j'..;clclal2.y established. i!"lis doctrine, known as 
colla.:.er-~1 es~o~~e~, di::ers :!:":::m r-es judlcata not 
o:1ly in the fact that all part:.es need not be the 
sa~e i:1 the two actions, but also in t!"le fact that 
t!"le es~oppel acclies onl"l to issues actually 
lit1ga~ed and ;;t ~o tho~e which cculd ha"le been 
C.e<:e::-;.:ir.ed." 
Sull:.?an v. Candas decided that a public roadway existed 
~rem the ~a:.:-1 h:.~hway along ~rctcman's Lane Southerly towards 
Jecr-ee ~as lt decided 
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then lands of John G. Condas. Nor was any issue decided agaLns: 
him therein unless it could be said that the refusal or faLlure 
of che District Court to hold that a public roadway existed up 
White Pine Canyon constituted a decision that no public road 
existed above his north line. 
The trial court invoked collateral estoppel in this 
case on the authority of the Utah case of Richards v. Hodson, 
supra, and the Arizona case of Mecham v. Citv of Glendale, 
supra. Yet in Richards, supra, this Court held that defendants 
were collaterally estopped from asserting the invalidity of 
the sale since that issue tEa been decided against them in the 
prior litigation. However, in Mecham supra, the Arizona 
Intermediate Court of Appeals held that Mechams were "Judl.ciall/' 
estopped from assuming a contrary position to that asserted by 
them in the prior litigation. 
Here the trial court was bound to follow the applica~~o~ 
of collateral estoppel as announced by this Court 1.n Richards, 
supra. There this Court emphasized that the issue had to be 
actually decided against a party in a prior action and would 
not apply to issues which could have been determined. The 
issue of whether a public road existed up White Pine Canyon over 
and beyond the lands of John G. Candas coulcl ha·1e t::ee:-. deci:ied 
in Sullivan v. Candas, but was not decided aca1.nst hL~. 
Even if the Findings of Fact in Sullivan v. Condas 
could be referred to herein, a careful readino thereo~ re~eals 
that there is no finding ·.vh1.ch spec1.ficall:.: f;_!1ds a ::1b~lC 
- 2 4 -
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roadway U? ~h1te ?.:._ne Canyon aver and beyond the then lands of 
John G. Candas. All references to the public road~ay therein 
are either o~er and across the lands of Sullivan or from the 
Park City highway and passes over and along Trottman's Lane and 
onto and across the lands of Sullivan with the center line 
specifically described to the gate on his south boundary. 
Likewise the Decree therein describes the public highway as 
running over and along Trottman's Lane southerly towards White 
Pine Canyon and not up '.'lh1te Pine Canyon. 
It 1s interesting to note that Finding ~o. 4 herein 
IR.212), superimposes over defendants' lands herein, the 
1dentical language of Finding ~o. 8 in Sull1van ~- Candas ~h1ch 
'AlaS ther-e lim1ted to the lands of Sullivan. \'/hat is more, 
Finding :-lo. 6 herein (R.2l2), finds t:'lat the Distr1ct Court in 
Sulli•Jan ,. Candas found that the road'Aia:: _:: :;"h.:._te Pine Canyon 
nad been used by the general publ1c s1nce 1873. ~owhere in 
those find1ngs d~d the District Court find that the general 
;>ublic had used t;'le roadway up •.vh::..te P1ne Canyon or abo·Je t!:le 
south boundary of Sull1~an's land. Likewise, nowhere in those 
findings did the District Court find a publ1c use dating back 
to the year 1873. 
The tr1al judge in Sull1van ~- Candas ~ho heard all of 
the test1mony of all of the 'Aiitnesses :J.nd knew the area made 
no find1ngs that a public road existed up White Pine Canyon 
beyond the south boundary of the Sullivan lands. Likewise, he 
·,;as ·:er~· careful .:._n :11s Decree to limit the public road to 
:s -
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Trottman's Lane from the Park City Highway southerly towards 
White Pine Canyon and specifically termlnated it at the gate 
on the south boundary of the Sullivan property. To permit the 
lower court in this case to second guess that trial judge some 
49 years later based on incomplete and inadmissible hearsay 
evidence would do violence to the law and would undermine the 
rules of evidence. 
The sum and substance of it all is that the lower court 
misconstrued the findings in Sullivan v. Candas e•1en if it 
could refer to them, misapplied the application of the Doctrine 
of Collateral Estoppel as announced by this Court in Richards •:. 
Hodson, supra, and in so doing committed serious and reversible 
error. 
POINT III. 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE ROADWAY CP 
WHITE PINE CA.:.\lYON OVER DEFENDANTS' LA:iDS IS -~ PL'BLIC 
ROAD IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY TO 
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The most discouraging part of this 'tJhole case 1.s t!1at 
the trial court in its zeal to implement its erroneous appli-
cation of the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel superimposed on 
defendants' lands selected abstracted testimon:; frCJm Sulli·:an 
v. Candas as it related to the roadway or trall 'ell=' '.Vhite P1:1e 
Canyon. The net effect thereof was to retry Sull::.·Jan 'f. Candas 
based on a cold, condensed, inadmissible .~bstract of the !".ecor:: 
without the benefit of viewing the exhibits or hear::.nc a:: of 
- 26 -
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t::e · .. ;l. :r-.es.ses. 
pre~ecess2r ~~ ~~:eres: ~s ~~lte a ~iffere~t thing from binding 
i.;:. 
=~ l~S ?~~d~~c ~o. 3, the trial court found that the 
=~a~wa: ~= ~~i~e ?~~e Can:on ~s a public road and has been 
~:--.:.eres:. 1?..212 
5 that the 
~ses -a~e ~- :.~e r=a~~3·.· ~ere ~n ~oct, ty hcrseback, in horse-
?.2121 
?e<:e:-s,-:r. ·:. :::..1:~, .:;...:.c:r3· :-:--.o:-:-.sor:. '/, .;s sue!"! 
' ' . ~ , 
... ~-...:.. :-~·:erse is clear t!'lat sue!"! 
3nd convincing evidence. T!'le 
:2~~l~c~·· and iccumentar:· evidence, 
· ....... :::- ....- -. -- :~ Sul:~~an 7. Candas, 
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clearly demonstrate that such findings are not only unsupported 
by the evidence but are contrary to the overwhel~lng we1ght of 
the evidence. 
At the outset it should be noted that there could be no 
use by either plaintiffs' or defendants' predecessors in 
interest prior to 1924 since neither was there prior to that 
time (R.SOO). The very earliest in time testified to by any 
witness in this case was James Archibald whose testimony was 
offered by plaintiffs in the form of his deposition IR.478-~31, 
incl.; Supplemental Record- James Archibald Deposition). The 
first time the witness Archibald was in ~hite Pine Canyon was 
1898 in the wintertime assisting his father in bringing out logs 
on a bobsled (ibid. pp. 5,6). The next time he was in White 
Pine Canyon was in 1903 when he "walked on, oh, k1nd of a road. 
It really wasn't a road, it was a trail about~ or 5 feet w1de. 
(ibid. p.S). He was there again in 1905 or 1906 on horseback 
(ibid. p.lO), and 1907 on horseback (ibid. p.ll), and never 
observed a wagon beyond the Sullivan property llbL:!. p.91, 2.:1d 
saw no one else on foot or horseback (ibid. pp. 12, 22), but 
did observe livestock in White Pine Canyon liblj. ?.22) 
The next witness in point of time who testified in ttis 
case was Earl Johnson whose testimony was o:fered by p:a1:1t1ffs 
in the form of his deposition i R. 4 78-481, incl.; S'_:pp:!_eme!'ltal 
Record - Earl Johnson Depositlon). He was flrst tjere whe!'l :1e 
was 12 years old, ie. 1903, and traveled up ~h1te P~:1e Ca:1yon 
several times a month by saddle horse ever:; year _mt~l ;_jl_7 
- 28 -
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r1tic. 9 p. 3,7,8). In 1903 "there was a '.fery poor trail but 
no sign of any wagon, no road for a '-'agon," which condition 
s~ayec pretty much the same every year from 1903 until 1917 
(ibid. p.B). During that entire period he never saw anyone 
else in the canyon nor did he ever see a wagon or other vehicle 
up \-lhite Pine Canyon beyond the Del Redden cabin and White Pine 
Canyon was not passable by a wagon (ibid. pp. 9,10). At that 
~i~e ~here was a ~cor road on which a wagon could travel up to 
::::el ?eCC.er. :::abi:1, but not beyond (ibid. p.ll). He never 
~~d see any logg1ng any ~ime out of ~hite Pine Canyon (ibid. p.l6). 
~he Wl~ness, Gilbert Kimball, called by plaintiffs in 
tn1s case, tes~1f1ed tha~ between 1915 and 1320 he tra~e:ed up 
a:1d cown •.-ihite Pi:1e Ca:1yon six or seven times on horseback (R.438, 
4~4) cur1ng which period he never saw anyone but sheep men 
iCondases) tra·;eli:Jg up ~he cani·on :R.~~::. .~.::.1 that existed 
at that time was a trail (R.442,445), which was steep and rough 
·,nth a lot of rocks (R.445). He rode single file because the 
;:::ail ·was not sufficiently wide ~o permit t·wo persons to ride 
sice by side (R.443,445). 
The witness, Douglas C. Archlbald, called by plaintiffs 
1n this case, testified that the first time he was in White 
P1ne Canyon was when he was 12 or 14 (1908-1910) at which time 
':'"lere 'wasn't an:.; trail or ::oad to a:71our.t to anything (R.471), 
wn1ch he ~ua!lfled by sta~ing that "there wasn't any speclfic 
':rall. You JUS~ ~ook the easiest 
·~a·.! 'J? t:;ere'' ·::::.~-5). He went up the canyon again in 1915 
- ~9 -
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and didn't see anyone else up there on elther occaslon 1?.~75:. 
Thus, plaintiffs' own evidence as shown by the testimon: 
of their own witnesses in this case is wholly contrary to 
Findings 3, 4 and 5. Furthermore, the documentary evidence 
offered by defendants in this case and the testimony of 
practically all of the witnesses called by defendants, are 
contrary thereto. 
Exhibit 16-D is a geologic ~ap dated 1901 and shows 
the roadways to the upper White Pine Canyon area from the 
Thaynes Canyon side and shows only a trail (dashed-line) down 
White Pine Canyon (R.739,740). 
Exhibit 31-D is a copy of the original c. S. Government 
Land Office survey map of Township 2 South, Range 3 East, 
S.L.B.& 11., dated September 17, 1903, and incl,.Jdes a ~ore legi:;:~ 
photocopy of the area in question. It shows a roadway enterinc 
the NE~ NE~ of Sec. l in the upper right hand corner coursing 
Southeasterly and terminating just below the !.'lgure "56.35" 
which terminus corresponds •.Yith a point j'.JS':: South of the Candas 
cabin as shown on Exhibits 1-P and 14-D. 1?.956,957,959,961). 
Exhibit 32-D comprises the original sur·1ey notes 'Jf: ::he 
Government surveyor in 1901 and 1902 from which Exhibit 31-~ 
was prepared (R.959,96l). The survey notes show '::he roadwaj 
crossing the east line of Section l, 19.0 change ~or'::h o: 
the W\ corner thereof, designated as "road to Can~n bears E and 
W." ( Exh . 3 2 - D , p . 3 0 8 ) . However, the survey notes 1o not sho~ 
a roadway crossing the south line of Section 1 E;-ch,. 32-:;, ::o.2So 
- ]1) -
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nor a roadwa; crossing ~he south line o~ Section 12 (Exh. 32-D, 
p.253) ~or a roadwa; crossing the ~ast line of Section 13 (Exh. 
32-D, p.253) all of which are now crossed by the existing White 
Plne Canyon Road (Exh. 14-D). Yet the survey notes show other 
roadways which cross the section lines, viz. the north line of 
Section 1 (Exh. 32-D, p. 308) being :Jorth of the subject proper-
tles 3nd on the south line of Section 24 (Exh. 32-D, p.305), 
belng South of the subject pro;:>erties on the \~est :'1onitor Flats. 
Exhibits 16-D, 31-D and 32-D 3re ancien~ public documents 
;:>repared by ;_::>ublic of~icials. The very clear inference there-
from is that in 1901 3.11d 1902, no roaci·..;a:: existed u;:> 'ilhlte Pine 
Canyon. Otherwlse the same would have been shown on tne 
geologic map, the official Go•;ernment Land 0f~ice survey map 
and would have been identlfled in t~e official notes of the 
Equally signlflcant are the patent documents covering 
the Gust Candas ;:>atent (Exh. 11-D), and ~he Peter G. Candas 
patent (Exh. 12-D), over which the ;:>resent White ?ine Canyon 
road passes (R.S34,536). The second page of Exhibit 11-D 
contair:s a certl~icate !Jy the Government staLlS clerk dated 
July 21, 1931, of the word "none" following the word "rights 
o: way ... Li~ewise en the second ;_::>age of the Testimony of 
'il1tness, Peter G. Candas, plaintiffs' predecessor, dated 
December 30, LJJ•), shows "1925, cut trails on Sees. 12, 13 T2S, 
?JE A~J Sec. :a, T2S, R~E. these ~rails belng necessary to get 
When asked about it the wltness, Peter G. Candas, 
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acknowledged that he probably made the ~orego:~o s:ate~e~t 
(R. 5 38) . Likewise, the second page of Exhibit 12-D coverl~G 
the Peter G. Candas patent contains a certificate by the 
Government status clerk dated January 27, 1930, of the •..;ord 
"none" following the words "rights of way". When asked about 
it the witness, Peter G. Candas, denied so advising the 9urea~ 
of Land Management (R.535). The same status clerk certi:icat::~. 
is contained in each of the Delbert H. Redde~ pate~ts Ex~. 
33-D, 34-D) and the John G. Candas patent (Exh. 35-J). 
The more current documentar:; e•Jide~ce comprlSln:: t~e 
general highway maps show that since at least 1937 only that 
portion of the White Pine Canyon road extending ~rom the ~aln 
state highwa:; to a point near the center line o: Section 1 
the old Candas cabin) has been designated as ;:ar~ o: t.le C'J:.Jr:':·· 
road system (Exh. 19-D, R.865). The same was tr~e ln 1350 
(Exh. 20-0, R.866), in 1966 !Exh. 21-D, R868• 
22-D, R.869), and in 1975 (Exh. 23-D, R.8"70). 
recent maps (Exh. 1-P, 14-DI, show the roadway 
lines) terminating at the old Candas cab in nea :- t:'le :::ere :e :- :J :' 
Section 1 and be:;ond only as a traLl !single-dashed 1Lnel. 
The witnesses, called J.efendants in thls case, pre>•::de a.:-1 
unbroken chain of credible evidence of no pub~ic read :r c~b1l: 
user from 1922 until the present ti~e whLc~ Sl~P~! :a~~c: :e 
ignored. The witness, Cleo Wri:ht, tes:i:Led t~a: ~e ~an 5ne~~ 
in the area from 1922 unt~l 1926 or ~327 
go up White Pine CanJOn because t:-,e~e ·..;as no ~oa.: 
- 3 2 -
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he hired a D-8 caterpillar which made a passable road for a 
4-wheel drive vehicle (R.692). The road was repaired in 1972 
and 1974 (R.696) and by "the movie people" in 1975 (R.697). 
The witness, James Ivers, Jr., testified that in 1928 
there was a narrow trail down White Pine Canyon (R.727) which 
was the same in 1929 (R.729). In 1930 the trail was narrow, 
rocky in places, was impassable by a wagon (R.734) and was 
no more than what a horse could travel which would be about 
18 inches or 24 inches wide (R.735,736). From 1930 ~ntil 
1941 he traveled the canyon on horseback approximately 15 times 
each year (R.731,735), and the trail did not change during the 
entire period (R.735) nor did he recall any change in the 
conditions from 1945 to 1950 (R. 737). He '.Vould occasionally 
run into sheepherders but never saw a sheep wagon along t:-te 
trail (R. 728,729,736). 
The witness, Andrew Louras, who was a ca~p tender for 
John G. Candas during the year 1932 and 1933, or 1933 and 
1934 (R.747,748) traveled the canyon on horseback at least 
once a week (R.749), testified that during those years just 
a trail existed up White Pine Canyon iR.749) ·.vhlch was only 
wide enough to get one horse through (R.750) 
The witness, David R. Spafford, who was camp tender for 
John Candas from 1929, 1930 and 1931 (R.768) who traveled the 
canyon at least a dozen times each summer (R.770J oy saC.dle 
horse (R.77l), testified that it was very steep and very narrow 
and heavily wooded and there was only one track where you ~ad 
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to go s1ngle rile (R./71) and when he returned in 1945 it was 
just a regular horse trail as it had always been (R.775). He 
never saw a wagon or a vehicle along the White Pine Canyon 
trail above the creek crossing (R.771) but encountered a rider 
once in a while (R.772). 
The witness, Albert L. Sorenson, who traveled White Pine 
Canyon every year from 1940 until 1950 on horseback (R.907) 
followed the main trail which was rough and rocky (R.904), did 
not observe any wagon tracks or roads or anyone else traveling 
along the trail rR.905). 
Defendant Chris J. Candas went up White Pine Canyon 
first in 1933 or 1934 (R.782) and traveled the canyon every 
year untll 1942 (R.788). He testified that during that period 
there existed only a single path, a single trail about two 
feet wide above the first creek cross1ng wi~h ~rees on both 
sides that would preclude vehicles from going up because it 
was too narrow (R.784). He never saw a wagon along the trail (R. 789) 
and never saw a vehicle up above the first creek crossing until 
after 1951 rR. 790, 791). He returned in 1946 and traveled the can-
yon 10 cr 12 t1mes and observed that there was basically no change 
since 1941 (R. 790). The conditions stayed pretty much the same 
until 1951 when a bulldozer spent time on the road (R.791). 
Defendant, ~arv Condas Lehmer, first went up White Pine 
Canyon when she was ll years old (1928), testified that the trail 
had ~he char3.cter1s~1cs of a :oot;;ath or a trail (R.925,93l). 
She v1sited ~he oroperty 1n White Pine Canyon in subsequent years 
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(R.93l), continuously except for 1942, and returned ln 195~ 
and has been in the area and on the property every year since 
then except for the summer of 1956 (R.932). Up until the time 
that the trail was improved as a roadway which was after 1948 
or 1948, the condition of the trail had not materially changed 
(R.943). Prior to that time she had never observed a wagon or 
any vehicle traveling along White Pine Canyon from the first 
stream crossing up to the flat (R.943,944). Beginning in about 
1963 she began having trouble with people driving four-wheel 
drive vehicles, motorcycles and some trucks who came down Whlte 
Pine Canyon from the Big Cottonwood-Park City side of the flats 
and would end up in front of her cabin (R.944). They were 
stopped by the north gate and for some she would unlock the 
gate and others she charged them with trespass or forced them 
to go back the way they came (R.945). 
The witness, Don H. Peterson, who was the foreman on 
the State Road (R.879), testified that in 19~1 an attempt was 
made to construct a road up White Pine Canyon with a ~D-18 
International cat. (R.818). They abandoned the effort when the 
cat. got high-centered on a boulder on a llttle steep hi~l 
below Moonshine cabin (R.883). Beyond the point where the cat. 
got stuck there was only a trail which he walked up to the 
flat (R.885). He then decided that there was no wa; to get 
through the road that they wanted to get to IR.88SI and took 
the cat. back out, loaded it up and took it up to Scott's ?ass 
and cleaned the road that way IR.883,884l. 
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The w1tness, Kent Christensen, testified that in 1942 
or 1943 a fairly good horsetra1l existed above the first creek 
crossing (R.912,915) and the condition of the trail did not 
change from 1942 to 1950 (R.916). The witness, Frank Marcellin, 
testified to similar conditions in 1944 (R.855) until the 
early 1950's (R.856). The '"'i tness, James F. Mum in, testified 
to similar conditions El the late 1940's (R.760,762,763). 
The only evidence to the contrary was the testimony 
af ;;lainti::s' ?redecessor, Peter G. Condas, Fred H. Bro·..ming, 
David L. Street, Francis A. Brun1·er, Chung M:;un Lee a:1d the 
?eter G. Candas testi:ied that h1s bra~her, John, 
would bring him s~pplies up White Pine Canyon in a car 1R.S08), 
or a truck (R. 50?). In 1925 there ·,.,ere quite a few people 
comi~g ~? al~cst e•:e~~ day travel~~g :~~~~ ~agons, bringing 
:irewood and logs cut, some ?eC?le were =raveling with trucks 
and some ?eop~e were traveling with cars, going to the other 
s1de o: the ::li·11de ( R. 510, 511 l. He testi:'ied that people used 
the roads e·:e~y da; 1 R.Sl2). He ran sheep on his ?roperty in 
l329 (R.539J and 1931 .,.,hen he lost his sheep (R.S40) and there-
after leased :-ns ?roperc:;· to Tracy tlright 1n 1932 iR.540) and 
to John Candas :ram .:..933 to 1967 (?.S.Jl•. From 1929 to 1967 
years 
He described :t as a tra1l where you could drive a 
~~e .~l~~es3, F~ei 3r~wnlng, testi~led that he worked 
:•:cr Jo~.n ·~Jr.•::a.o :'r'Jrn l':S t·a L<30 'R . .J33:, at which time the 
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road went up White Pine Canyon above Pete Candas' property 
(R.487). Some people went up there with wagons and horses and 
some went up there with pickup trucks or cars, sometimes 2 or 
3 times a week, sometimes once a week, or as far as every 2 
weeks (R.489,490). He saw them bring logs on a wagon (R.491, 
492). He traveled up the road sometimes on foot and sometimes 
on horseback (R.412). He observed prints of two tracks showing 
that four-wheeled vehicles had been on the road (R.498). Durin~ 
the years 1925, 1927, 1928 and 1929 he was only on the property 
occasionally (deposition of Fred Browning (R.377, 497). 
The witness, David L. Street, testified that he first 
went up White Pine Canyon in 1950 to take a dozer up to 
establish a signal tower for the highway patrol (R.560). He 
described the road up White Pine Canyon as passable for wagons 
or trucks and cars if you would like to take your car in that 
kind of place (R.560). He did not do work on the road as he 
went up (R.561). It took two days getting up there (R.565). 
He high-centered the D-8 cat. and had to use dynamite to get 
it off (R. 566). 
The witness, Francis A. Brunyer, hiked up White Pine 
Canyon in 1942 on three occasions and once in 1943 (R.969,9i0) 
He described the road or trail as somewhat bushy, but it was net 
a man-made road. There were tracks there. It was pushed dcwn 
and hardened (R.969). On none of those occasions did he see 
anyone traveling along the trail (R.S87J. 
The witness, Chung Myun Lee, testi:'led as an 2:<:Jert ·.v1tness 
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that based on his lnspectlons of 1940 and 1950 aerial photographs 
it ~as his opinion that an unimproved road or jeep trail existed 
up the bottom of White Pine Canyon (R.l032,1034), but he could 
not tell whether it was man-made or animal-made (R.l036,1044, 
1045) . 
Plaintiff George P. Candas testified that in approx-
imately 1945 when he was 10 years old he went up to the flats 
with hls uncle, John Candas, in his sheepwagon or truck (R.57l, 
j 72) . Thereafter sometimes he would go up the canyon on a horse 
or in a jeep with his cousin, George (R.573). He observed 
people using the White Pine Canyon road from :945 up until 1971 
(~.579), except for the years 1966 and 1967 (R.581,585). How-
ever, he never did describe the trail or road. 
Plaintiff Harry P. Candas testified about the same as 
plaintiff George P. Candas, going back to :?~~ ~he~ he was 12 
}ears old (R.604) for almost every year thereafter (R.606). 
Plaintiff John P. Candas testified about the same since about 
the early 1950's (R.674). However, neither testified as to 
the condition of the trall or road. 
There was no evidence to show that any maintenance 
work had been done by either the county or the State on the 
Whlte Pine Canyon road above the John G. Candas cabin. From 
1930 until 1950 the onl~· mai:1tenance work performed by the 
State was along Trottman's Lane up to the John Candas cabin 
but no mai:1tena:1ce ·tJorK. •tJas i:)er:ormed beyond the gate (R. 464, 
4 6 s) . From 193-;" ·.mtil the prese:1t time Summit County received 
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no Class "B" road funds for maintenance of any roadways South 
of the John Condas cabin or gate but did receive funds for 
that segment from the highway up to the gate during that 
period (R. 872). 
Defendants respectfully submit that the foregoing are 
fair and accurate summaries of the evidence and testimony on 
the issues of public road and public user in this case. Such 
testimony and evidence falls far short of establishing by 
clear and convincing evidence a public road by public user 
across defendants' lands. In fact, the overwhelming weight 
of the above evidence proves otherwise. Where, as here, it is 
clear that the findings and decision of the trial court are not 
supported by clear and convincing evidence, it is the duty of 
this Court to reverse. Accordingly, Findings of Fact ~os. 3, 
4 and 5 must be set aside and the Decree must be reversed. 
POINT IV. 
THE GENERAL FINDINGS OF FACT OF A PuBLIC ROAD ARE 
CONTRADICTED BY THE SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT 
THEREON AND MUST BE SET ASIDE. 
The general Findings of Fact Nos. 3, 4 and 5 make :indings 
of a public road and continuous public user on foot, by horse-
back, in horsedrawn wagons and in trucks and cars across 
defendants' lands from 1873 until 1971 (R.212). However, the 
specific Finding of Fact ~o. 9 fLnds that between 1325 a~d 1928 
a wooden gate of only su:ficient width to perr.nt passage o: a 
person riding horseback was constructed across the roadway at 
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t:1e so;~the:-:_/ e:1d of the pasture area (R.213). The latter 
:indi:1g is clearly supported by the evidence (Exh. 15-D; R.665, 
667, 682, 688, 733, 751, 752, 772, 783, 903, 904, 914, 941 942) 
Thus, it was impossible for any vehicle to travel through that 
gate until it was '.-.'idened in 1951 (R.l087,1089). 
Likewise, specific Finding of Fact No. 9 finds that 
between 1925 and 1928 the wooden gate was constructed across 
~he roadway entering the John G. Candas property on the north 
line thereof (2..22.3). Specific Finding o: Fact ~o. 10 finds 
that such wooden gate and its replacements were usually main-
tained in a closed and locked condition, whenever John G. 
Candas and his successors were away from the property, generally 
since the construction thereof until the present time and 
was generally mai:ltained in a c2.osed but unlocked condition when 
the·.· '.ver:e present on the ;:noperty. It :~rt~er: :~nds that said 
gates ·,.;ere generall:,· posted with "keep o~t" or "no trespassing" 
s1gns si:1ce the construct1on thereo: until the present time 
IR.213). Such speci:1c :inding is incompatible with the 
r:equisite intent1on or conduct of John G. Candas or his succes-
sors to abandon the roadwa:_: to the public use. Morris v. Blunt, 
49 l'tah 243, 161 Pac. 1127 (1916); Hall •r. :Jorth •Jgden Citv, 
109 l'tah 32S, 17S P.::'C. 7')3 r1946l; Thompson\'. :Jelson, 2 Utah 
2d 340, 213 P.2d 7:20 .19541; Gill:nor '1. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 
391 P.2d -126 rl964); ?eterson ·r. Combe, 20 L'tah 2d 376, 438 
P.2d 545 rl%8); and Thomson ,,. . C::mdas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 
Ll~ewise, the foreoolng specific findings 
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contradict the above general findings of public road and public 
user and as such the general findings cannot stand. 
A judgment which rests on some particular finding for its 
validity and support may not be upheld where such finding is 
contradicted by another finding treating of the same essential 
matter. 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, §1260, p. 212. If, on the sa~e 
evidence the trial court should make findings of fact necessari:~ 
contrary to each other, such action would be capricious and 
such inconsistent findings should not be permitted to stand. 
Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 4 Utah 2d 181, 290 P.2d 689 
(1955). 
The lower court was obviously concerned with the lack o: 
public user resulting from the establishment of gates by John 
Candas preventing use of the roadway (R.l91,192). However, it 
dismissed such concern since it had already concluded tha~ on 
the basis of Sullivan v. Candas the public road pre-dated his 
acquisition of title. Yet its findings cannot be reconciled 
on this point. If the findings prove irreconcilable, it is the 
duty of the court to accept those most favorable to the appella:cc. 
76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, §1260, p.212. 
General Finding of Fact No. 6 is clearly erroneous as she~ 
by the summaries of the evidence and testimony of the vntnesses 
under Point III hereinabove. Furthermore, the distr1ct court 
in Sullivan v. Candas did not find that the road up White Pine 
Canyon through the lands now owned by defendants was a public 
road as is demonstrated under Point II hereinabove. 
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It ~allows tha~ Finding of Fact ~os. 3, 4, 5 and 6 must 
be set aside and the Decree being based ~hereon must be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The key issue on this appeal is whether a public roadway 
can be established across the lands now owned by defendants on 
the basis of the Abs~ract of Record in Sullivan v. Candas and 
the Brlefs filed therein. Pivotal to that issue is whether 
such Abstract of ?ecord is admissible in evidence in this 
case for if i~ is not, the evidence is wholly insufficien~ to 
establlsh a public road over defendants' la~ds. In fact, 
absent the foregoing Abstrac~ of Record, the evidence over-
·,;helmingly establishes no p~.:bllc user and no public road. 
'!et ;>laint::.ffs ha·1e the ';)ur::en of establishinc "the tJublic road 
o~ clea~ a~~ conv~ncing e·;~dence. 
0n the bas::.s o~ S~.:ll::.van v. Candas, the trial court 
erroneously a;>plled the 2oc~rine o~ Colla~eral Estoppel and 
declded ~he case agalnst the defendants without affording them 
the reassured o;>portunity -to offer rebuttal evidence of the 
same caliber. To lmplement its decision the trial court super-
imposed on defendants' lands selected abstracted testimony 
from the Abstract of ?ecord in Sullivan v. Candas and made 
flnd::.ngs herein on de~endan~s' lands based on findings therein 
on Sull::.van's lands. The ne~ effect thereof was to retry 
Sulll·;ar. '/.Candas based on a cold, ccncensed, inadmissible 
abstract without the bene~lt o~ viewinc the exhlbits therein 
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or hearing all of the live testimony of all of the witnesses 
therein. In so doing, the lower court here attempted to 
second-guess the trial judge there who made no findings of a 
public road up White Pine Canyon beyond the south boundary of 
the Sullivan lands and who carefully limited the public road 
therein to Trottrnan's Lane and specifically terminated it 
at the gate on the south boundary of the Sullivan lands. 
If anything came out loud and clear from the evidence 
in this case, it was that from at least 1903 until 1950 only 
a one-horse trail existed up the bottom of White Pine Canyon 
which was impassable by all vehicles. It was not until 1951 
when the road was sufficiently improved to afford passage to 
even a four-wheel drive vehicle. Equally clear was that since 
at least 1903 until the present time there was no public user 
of the road which troubled even the lower court. 
In face of the overwhelming credible evidence to the 
contrary and in spite of it, the lower court found a public 
road which pre-dated the acquisition of defendants' property 
by their father. In so doing, it completely changed the 
status quo of the previous 54 years and ordered defendants to 
remove the gates which even it found had been maintained in 
one form or another during the last 54 years, both locked and 
unlocked, and posted with "keep out" or "no trespass1ng" s1gns. 
This has to be a most shocking end result. 
The sum and substance of it all is that the lower court 
has now opened up defendants' lands to the general publlc by 
establishing a public road across their lands ~h1ch ne~er 
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exlS~e~ ln ~ac~ or in la~. ~e respect~ully submit that the 
general findings of a public road and public user must be 
set aside and the Decree of the trial court must be reversed 
and t~e case remanded wit~ instructions to enter an Amended 
Decree dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint and adjudging that 
the roadway across de~endants' lands in White Pine Canyon is 
their ;:>ri·;ate road·way and plalntiffs own no interest or right 
t~ereln, or that ~ai~ing, a new trial. 
Respect~ully submitted, 
-/) /' / /' /; , (_-/rost-Ml ;,o'n\.K -, 
Attorney for Defendants a'~ 
A;:>pellants George J. Candas, 
Mary Condas Lehmer, Chris J. 
Condas, ~ick J. Condas, Ellen 
Condas Bayas and Alexandra 
Candas ::Jckey 
520 Con~lnen~a: Eank Building 
Salt ~a~e =-=1· ~tah 84101 
day of June, 19-8, 
cc~:es cf t~e ~oregoing Brief of Defendants-
.:..;::~el:an~s ~o :::.a:::cn :. S;:e:".cer, a~torney for Plaintiffs-
?.es;::oncen~s. ::.2J: 3ene::'ic:a::_ ::__:~e Tower, 36 South State Street, 
-- -.: , 
/,,·a/ 
Attorney 
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